20c DECEMBER 18, 1950

New Republic

PEACE WITHOUT APPEASEMENT

AN EDITORIAL

CRISIS IN EUROPE

FIRST OF A SERIES

ROBERT R. NATHAN ON HOW TO MOBILIZE

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

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New Republic

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WASHINGTON WIRE

THE US is not going to be trapped into an all-out Asiatic war; only a handful of Congressmen favor it. We have been licked in Korea (let's face it), but the record of UN has been kept clean. That's to the good.

Where we go from here is the question. Russia, pushing on China, has shown itself more willing to precipitate World War III than Washington believed possible. To gloss over this fact would be folly. It must be faced. Something pretty close to mobilization in this country will follow.

Dapper Mr. Attlee has come and gone, looking as mild and commonplace and unglamorous as Truman himself or the man who reads your gas meter, the very type of little man you would have expected to be the other member of the Truman haberdashery firm. In wartime, Britain and America produce a Churchill or a FDR; in the aftermath, they turn to Truman-Attlee. Both leaders are now in political trouble at home, Attlee operating on a paper-thin, five-vote majority—Truman on a paper majority that isn't really there at all. Both feel pressures modifying their own powers, Attlee from a national desire for a policy of patience, caution, restraint—Truman, for one of firmness.

On a couple of things the talks produced progress. The US has got to make more raw materials available quickly for Britain's rearmament; this will be done. Also, Britain wants Eisenhower named right away to command in Europe; with shrewdness, it realizes this will turn US eyes to the West. The appointment should come quickly.

But Truman-Attlee disagreed, too. The Administration can't bear to acknowledge that Mao Tse-tung controls China, although Britain has recognized the fact. Failure to recognize Mao diplomatically before Korea makes it 10 times harder for Washington to do so now, and admission to the UN would seem like reward for aggression. Truman-Acheson are bound by the "tough" attitude of Congress, anyway. But the US faces isolation on this. Continued support of the discredited Formosa Government-in-exile looks silly to our Allies and gives a handle to appeasers who charge Chinese aggressors have a case against "American provocation."

Greatest Washington irony was continued GOP denunciation of Acheson as an "appeaser" when he was actually rejecting Attlee's plea to negotiate general settlement in Asia and offering in turn his own proposal for a "limited war." It is hard to know how far this limited war policy is Acheson's or a concession to appease the GOP Senate non-appeasers. Whatever it is, it isn't going to be popular with America's Allies.

All in one morning last week we wandered into three sessions in the Senate Office Building which cumulatively shed light on the Washington mood. In the first, Taft cheerily discussed the GOP drive to get Acheson, suddenly revived by Senator Ives (R, N.Y.), in a proposed party motion of censure. We came away gloomily from Taft, even though Republicans seem to be backing away from Ives's move which has subsequently received Governor Dewey's well-merited condemnation. Next, we stopped outside the door of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Inside, an ex-Communist who has made something of a business of testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee was declaring that Mrs. Anna Rosenberg, just named Assistant Secretary of Defense, is known to him as a former member of a "John Reed Club." Mrs. Rosenberg denies this under oath. We lingered only long enough to hear a little woman in black, who said she spoke for the "wives and mothers of America," tell reporters that she was

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sure Mrs. Rosenberg was a poor security risk. Why?—because her veracity had been challenged, to be sure! Thoroughly depressed, we climbed to our third tryst. Before a Senate subcommittee, a CIO leader was telling quietly and soberly how the two newspapers and the radio station in Anderson, S. C., owned by ex-Senator Hall, together with a second independent radio station, closed every avenue for presentation of the union viewpoint. There it was, all calmly documented, in black and white. The press and radio even rejected paid advertising. It was a total anti-union blackout. Only one side was given: like Russia. There are 16 textile mills in the county. Unionism has to hide underground. Under the Wagner Act you might have done something about it; under Taft-Hartley the road is blocked.

At long last we got to see the comedy, "Born Yesterday," the NY hit now touring Washington and the provinces. The hero, if you don't know it, is a Washington writer for the *New Republic,* and we felt drawn to him right away. He is knowledgeable, powerful, incorruptible and a handsome dog, too, under his bone rims. Modesty makes us ask how playwright Kanin ever penetrated our collective anonymity? A true likeness if ever we saw one! We commend this drama highly.

Truman had a tough week last week. His close friend and secretary, Charlie Ross, died; there was the business of dealing with Attlee, bland, calm and irritatingly sure of his own position. Then finally there was the Washington *Post* music critic's half-apologetic comment after a big concert by daughter Margaret that she was attractive but couldn't sing very well. This was too much. The Truman family life is singularly close. Margaret is an only daughter whose musical career is more important to Dad than his own political career. If Andy Jackson had been in the White House he might have written the Presidential outburst to critic Hume that followed: uncouth, undignified, unjust and very human. Everybody wishes Harry wouldn't do these things, but sometimes he just has to blow off.

Washington T.R.B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Material on Utopia

SIR: I have recently completed a history of Utopian Communities in America, 1680-1880. This book (entitled *Heavens on Earth*) will be published in the spring of 1951, and I wish to obtain any further illustrative material that may exist, as soon as possible.

May I ask anyone who is willing to lend, rent or sell any prints, portraits or photographs relating to the Shakers, the Rappites, New Harmony, Fourier and Fourierism, Brook Farm, Fruitlands, Amana, Oneida and Icaria, to communicate with me, care Turnstile Press, 10 Great Turnstile, London, W. C. 1.

All correspondence will be most gratefully acknowledged and every care will be taken of any material submitted.

London, England MARK HOLLOWAY

A Frightening Dilemma

SIR: I read the *New Republic* of November 20 with special interest. On page three you say: "A frightening aspect is General MacArthur's conviction that he knows the Oriental mind, that it respects only force, and that he is running his own foreign policy. . . . MacArthur wants to bomb hell out of the Chinese concentrations behind the border right away, and he is fuming over restraints from the Pentagon, Acheson and the UN."

On page six you say: "If China continues to fight the UN in Korea, the UN will be forced to announce that the United Nations commander has full authority to take all action necessary to stabilize the situation if Chinese-Communist forces continue to flood into Korea."

MacArthur's attitude may be a frightening fact; more frightening is the fact that a journal like the *New Republic* now substantially agrees with him.

San Francisco, Calif. GEORGE OLSHAUSEN

[Editors' note: Sure, it is a frightening situation.]

Mid-Term Paradox

SIR: Really there is nothing paradoxical in the situation Mr. Tyler describes in "The Mid-Term Paradox" (the *NR,* November 27). The mid-term biennial election gives the disaffected but not thoroughly dissatisfied voter a chance to discipline his party without voting to kick it out of office. . . . The fact should be faced that a vote to place legislature and executive in opposing hands is a vote for deadlock. . . . What needs rubbing into the popular consciousness is that among constitutional governments only ours makes possible a deadlock not of deliberate intent. It is commonly said that the only remedy for this anomaly is a cabinet government of the French or English type.

Let the President speak as follows to the electorate (when occasion shall justify it): "There is an element among you, not a majority but strong enough to decide any election, for whom the only reality in the Federal Government is the Presidency. It is the President who is the goat when things go wrong. . . .

"So I am going to handle the present crisis thusly: I have secured the conditional resignations of the 50 Congressmen of my party who were elected by the narrowest margins. The condition is that the opposition shall match these resignations with 50 equivalent ones. I have filed with the Supreme Court my own resignation and those of my cabinet, all conditioned on my failure to secure from the elections which these resignations shall produce a good working majority. . . ."

But would the opposition play the game here proposed? The party that refused such a challenge would show a lack of the sporting spirit which would condemn it to remain perpetually in opposition. . . .

East Jordan, Mich. FRANK FOOTE

"Future of the Left"

SIR: In your editorial on "The Future of the Left" you seem to say that the biggest threat to the liberal program comes from the conservative Democrats. But, if you recognize the realities of the political situation, isn't it better to have these people allied at least in name, and on the now crucial foreign policy issues? Certainly the President and most of the national leaders have shown through their stands on the McCarran law and similar issues, that they are keeping the role and the influence of the Donkey Tories in their place on the basic issues.

Flushing, N. Y. JOSHUA WHITEHEAD

Working Democrats

SIR: I had to tell you that I agree with your editorial, "Future of the Left" (the *NR,* December 4). I was especially heartened by your remarks on the need for liberals to work with the Democratic organization "without accepting its dictates."

Where are those New York City liberals of yesteryear who assured us that by voting for O'Dwyer in 1949, we would insure a Democratic sweep in 1950—right down to dogcatcher?

Brooklyn, N. Y. JULIAN EINSTEIN

Correction

Because of a typographical error, the first sentence in Washington Wire last week was garbled. It should have read "Russia wants us to fight Red China, and a large part of America wants the same thing."

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VOLUME 123, NUMBER 25, ISSUE 1881, WASHINGTON, D. C., DECEMBER 18, 1950

New Republic

PEACE WITHOUT APPEASEMENT

THE United States has suffered a major defeat. We are not used to defeat. The world is watching us to see how we will act. Will we crawl back into our isolationist hole? Will we sweep unready peoples into a losing war? Will we inspire all peoples with a new spirit of wisdom and courage and calm resolution? In the blizzards of Korea our soldiers are fighting heroically so that we at home may be heroic. On our reaction turns the future of the Free World.

The immediate cause of our defeat is Gen. Douglas MacArthur. He proclaimed the doctrine that Orientals respond only to strength. He destroyed much of our strength in Asia by his own weakness—his egotism. He gambled the authority of the UN and the leadership of the US on his own unfounded hunches. He made no allowances for the possibility that he might happen to be wrong.

But the blame falls less on MacArthur's bent shoulders than on the men in the US who betrayed the tradition of a free press by raising MacArthur to a pedestal of hero worship and infallibility where no servant of a free society should stand.

These same groups have now gone wholly mad. Luce announces that the Third World War is already raging. McCormick surrenders at one stroke to Moscow declaring:

"It is absurd to think that we can be any more effective militarily in Europe than we have been in Korea. Therefore, instead of spending ourselves into Communism, we should pull in our expenditures, call out the National Guard to hold Northern Canada, and leave the treacherous so-called Allies in Europe to their own protection."

Hearst adds:

"Our sovereignty has been impaired by making us a virtual vassal of the United Nations which disrupts our councils and seeks to fly its mongrel flags over our public buildings . . . We should get out of the United Nations . . . and end our unrequited efforts to support and supply an ingrate Europe."

Americans, of course, do not give up so easily. Yet these views are significant as caricatures of a new isolationist trend that is cutting far beneath the surface. There is a lack of faith in Asia's ability to withstand Communism. There is a loss of faith in Western Europe's will to survive. There is a loss of confidence in our capacity to determine the outcome of struggles overseas. There is a growing conviction that arming the Free World will cause an inflation that will destroy our own free society. There is a growing desire to conserve our own resources and defend our own shores. All of these feelings might be met on the level of reason. But they are not all open to reason. And all these feelings are exaggerated 10 times over in the demoralization of free peoples overseas.

The only answer is intelligent action, directed toward a known end. The Truman-Attlee conference was the first step in that direction. It took the first great stroke, in blocking any extension of a losing campaign in Korea by war against Manchuria. That prepared the way for our recovery.

What must our next steps be?

II

First, we need to be clear about the nature of defeat. We see it as humiliating; it need not be. Munich was shameful, not Dunkirk. And Korea is neither Munich nor Dunkirk.

There is no thought of a compromise with North Korea and China which legalizes successful aggression. And if we are forced to withdraw from Korea it will be with men and equipment, and with honor. It is no disgrace to lose a campaign. The disgrace would be to surrender in panic and hysteria the principles for which we fight.

The alternatives in Korea are to hold a line or beachhead or to withdraw. These should be examined in relation to our future actions.

There are three possible reasons for holding some portion of Korea: First, to save our South Korean allies from the murderous vengeance of the North Koreans; second, to salvage through diplomacy as much as can be retrieved of our fight against Communist aggression; third, to resume the fight for a free and unified Korean state. In the first two cases our forces would not be required to remain in Korea indefinitely. But there is no near prospect of reinforcing them. Such territory

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as they hold will have to be held by the forces now in Korea. But if we were to remain in Korea to build up for a counter-offensive, we should have to commit additional forces in large numbers in the near future. We do not have them.

General Collins stated in Tokyo that the 82nd Airborne Division is the only effective force remaining in the United States. To this might be added the 2nd Marine Division. These two units are our military fire brigades, one airborne and one amphibious, all we have left for all our commitments at home and abroad. Other Regular Army divisions have been stripped to fill up divisions in Korea and to furnish nucleii for new divisions now being organized. The four National Guard divisions in service, just brought up to strength with selectees, will not be ready until summer or later. Thus a new offensive in Korea could not be initiated earlier than late summer of 1951, and again would strip the United States of all its effective ground forces. It would prevent the reinforcement of Europe, which is still the great prize of Soviet aggression.

III

If we withdraw, we are faced with Chinese and Soviet regimes confident of their power, contemptuous of the United Nations, and ready to take full advantage of their demonstrated military superiority over the West. French Indo-China is certain to be the next victim, and Japan, completely disarmed, may be threatened. Our withdrawal can be no farther than to Japan.

It is obvious that Japan must be permitted to acquire defensive armaments without delay to enable the United States to reduce its forces there. Yet, even limited rearmament of Japan is physically impossible in one or two years. Thus, we are faced with heavy military commitments in the Far East for an undefined period. Only the naval weakness of China and the Soviet Union makes it possible to depend upon such small forces as we have available.

Indo-China, if it is marked for conquest, cannot be held by our military aid. It is a French colony and not a free state sponsored by the UN. The French have failed there, and their belated reforms today are probably too late. Ho Chi-minh is recognized by Russia and Communist China. If, with the aid of Soviet and Chinese advisers and equipment, Ho cannot defeat the French, 750,000 Chinese soldiers stand behind him to finish the job.

Indo-China is the gateway to Southeast Asia. If it falls, all Southeast Asia may be lost. Yet if action to save this area means committing our troops, we cannot act. We have no forces with which to fight.

IV

Can we hold by negotiation what cannot be held by military power? That question forced a division between the US and India. It blocked effective action in the Truman-Attlee conference.

In that conference Acheson argued that China was committed to further aggression and subservience to the USSR. He proposed limited negotiations with China on Korea. He held that Chinese aggression there could not be bought off by concessions elsewhere. He concluded that, if China refused a settlement, we should undertake measures of limited war.

In reply, Attlee maintained that an independent attitude in Peking could still be encouraged by greater ties with the West. He asserted that China had no incentive to negotiate on Korea alone since she had already gained military decision there. He proposed negotiations looking toward a general settlement with the new regime. He added that a limited war would gain nothing for the West and would simply serve to justify further Communist aggression.

Historically, it seems clear to us that Attlee was right, and Acheson was wrong. Acheson's position was perhaps justified while we were winning in Korea. Today we are in no position to insist that China be hauled before the bar and made to pay for her trespasses.

The future of negotiation depends on the outcome of India's present efforts in mediation. Nehru, who was proved right on Korea, deserves our fullest support. If the price of compromise on Korea proves to be negotiation for a general settlement, then we should pay that price.

Appeasement is a wild word, especially when it is flung out by former isolationists. Negotiation in itself is not appeasement. Negotiation which serves to sanction aggression or sacrifice basic principles may become appeasement. But negotiation which seeks to prevent aggression and to restore vital principles is necessary and honorable.

No vital principle is sacrificed in extending recognition to China. The Soviet fiction that Chinese troops in Korea are volunteers is exceeded in inanity only by our fiction that no government exists on the Chinese mainland which can send troops to Korea.

Nor is a vital principle sacrificed in bringing China's Communist Government into the UN. If the UN were an organization of democratic and peaceful nations, neither Russia nor China should belong, and India and other uncommitted nations would leave the UN. As long as the UN seeks to be a universal organization, the rulers of China are entitled to UN membership. They

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have undermined their claim by fighting against UN forces. Yet, as a non-member, China has not been bound by the charter. Even had Communist China as a UN member defied the UN, sanctions rather than expulsion, would have been the UN's initial response.

We doubt if negotiations can succeed. The war in Indo-China is not negotiable. Nor is the conflict with Chiang Kai-shek. Nor is the determination of the Communists to drive all Western and democratic influences off the mainland of Asia. Nor is their ambition to "liberate" oppressed peoples in all directions around them. We have no doubt that there was a sharp conflict between moderates and extremists in Peking over the wisdom of war against the UN. The extremists won. Their wisdom has been crowned by spectacular success. Their strength is undoubtedly multiplied. The moderates are likely to be liquidated, purged or at least silenced for the next decade. For these reasons Attlee's gamble is against longer and longer odds.

Yet, if negotiations fail, they must fail because of Chinese intransigence and not because of our partnership with Chiang Kai-shek. There is no early hope for Nationalist action on the mainland. There is no assurance that if we transported the Nationalists to the mainland they would not turn their weapons against us. Fifty percent of the troops in Korea are ex-Nationalists and eighty percent of their weapons are US weapons, turned over by Nationalist armies to the Communists. If Nationalist soldiers would not fight for a Chinese Government against an untried Communist rebellion which threatened their homes, would they fight today against an established Chinese Government which occupies their homeland and is routing the armies of the US and the UN?

If negotiations fail, and we are driven from Korea, will we gain by a limited war with China? A blockade of China would tie down our fleet and arouse resentment among Chinese. Lesser action would involve export and import embargoes and the freezing of all Chinese assets abroad. If we alone acted, we would be hurt more than China. If all, or even some of the free nations could act together in blocking trade with China, the regime would suffer and Soviet resources would be further strained.

V

Further losses may be necessary in Asia. They will be costly but not irreparable. Only the loss of Western Europe is irreparable for the Free World.

The risk of aggression is heightened in Europe because of our present weakness. It is heightened further because the next steps, necessary to defend Europe, include those which the USSR has bitterly opposed.

The first vital step is the creation of a European armed force. Truman and Attlee agreed on the urgency of this step. They agreed that the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander should be held back until he is given commitments by Western Europe to integrate existing armies. Eisenhower's appointment would serve for a short time to regain lost morale here and in Europe. The next step is up to the nations of Western Europe. When they move, we should increase many times our appropriations to be spent for defense in Europe. Increased production for defense will help to restore a long-range sense of confidence.

The second step lies in the defense of Yugoslavia. To Stalin, Tito is still the "insolent dwarf" who challenges the Soviet empire. He must be crushed, and large satellite armies are being raised for that purpose. Tito's 30 divisions hold a 1,200-mile frontier, an almost impossible task. Yet Yugoslavia is now vital to the defense of Western Europe, and if Tito is ready to face again the most terrible warfare—partisan warfare—to halt Soviet aggression, we must help.

Yugoslavia has accepted raw materials from MDAP so she has been brought into relation with the NATO. Full membership is undesirable and unnecessary. But a guarantee of Yugoslavia's borders by NATO seems vital today. And Yugoslavia could be brought into the ERP. The first step is to pass without strings the present $35-million grant before Congress; the next is to pass the additional $35 million the Yugoslavs requested and the State Department failed to forward to Congress. The third step is to make MDAP supplies available to Yugoslavia; the fourth, to rush to conclusion the loan now before the World Bank.

A third source of immediate conflict in Europe is German rearmament. NATO has agreed to arm German units. The Soviet Government has warned that it will not tolerate a regular German army. Do the Russians mean what they say? The best answer is *yes,* only sometimes they are unable to carry out their threats. What are the deterrents today to Soviet action against Western Europe?

One is misery within the USSR; another is Soviet unwillingness to wage a general war when her prospects without a general war are still bright. Are these deterrents sufficient in light of that fact that a rearmed Germany is a far greater threat to Russia than a Western-oriented Korea? The argument that a German army would be defensive is no argument. For the Germans reply correctly that offense is the best defense and add that they will fight only if they can carry the fight beyond their own borders.

Coupled with our present weakness, these arguments

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seem to us extremely grave. They warrant arming the Germans last among the components of a European army, and they justify a re-opening of negotiations with the USSR even though it is made clear that the creation of a police state in Western Germany or its abandonment to Russia via neutralization is not negotiable today.

VI

We have suggested here a short-term program of negotiating where we can and building strength where we can. The main area where strength must be built is in the US.

Our immediate military weakness is in ground forces and tactical aviation. The slow-motion build-up of the Army to 18 divisions is not the answer. The issue was evaded when we committed all our forces to Korea. It is still being evaded. In October, 1940, in a far less critical situation, President Roosevelt mobilized the National Guard and Reserves and used selective service to bring them up to strength.

The first step is much greater military mobilization. The next is economic action to back it up, and to halt inflation.

It means a shift from limited to full control on materials.

It means full price and wage controls to be established as fast as efficient administration will permit.

It means a much higher rate of taxation, including an immediate excess profits tax, and rigorous corporate, individual and excise taxes.

It means a full draft on manpower—the greatest shortage and the hardest problem that we face.

It means a declaration of a National Emergency to bring home the urgency of our needs.

It means stripping Government service of the Sawyers, the Snyders, the Steelmans and other uninspired and mediocre job-holders and time-servers and replacing them with men who can lift Government service to the level of our new tasks.

These are the initial requirements of peace without appeasement. Who can argue that peace is not worth the price?

THE WEEK

THE UN WAITS

LAKE SUCCESS (NR correspondent)

This was another week in which Lake Success was only a backwater. Numerous UN committees droned through their usual activities; but all eyes were on the tragedy of Korea. There was a general feeling among the delegates that real political action for peace must wait upon some sort of stabilization of military events.

Yet, in any other times, what was happening at the UN would have seemed of tremendous importance. This week saw the final decline of the Security Council and the emergence of the General Assembly as the vital instrumentality of the UN in the cause of peace. The action which has been developing through the past few weeks to circumvent the Big-Power veto in the Security Council came to a climax as the machinery moved toward Assembly action to demand that the Chinese Communists retire behind the Manchurian border. The resolution, of course, seemed much more like a futile gesture than anyone would have predicted when the step was planned a few weeks ago. No one at Lake Success now expects the Chinese Communists to heed the bidding of the UN, and very few believe that they will stop at the 38th Parallel.

The situation by which the UN was confronted was fantastically far from anything contemplated when the organization was created at San Francisco five and a half years ago. At that time it was universally assumed that one aggressor nation would be faced by the whole power of the rest of the world. Perhaps the resulting moral isolation would itself be effective; but if not, there could be no question but that the United Nations could deploy such crushing economic and military strength that nobody could stand against it. At Lake Success last week there was bitter realization of the fact that two aggressor nations, with the help of a third, seemed likely to crush all the forces that the UN had thus far chosen to put into the field.

Possibly because other members of the UN now feel keenly that they could have done more than they did in Korea, there was a notable diminution of criticism of the US at Lake Success. One nation after another is coming to realize that appeasement of the Communist world does not work, and that any sort of negotiation is enormously difficult unless it is backed by great strength. The 13 Asiatic countries which last week appealed to Communist China and got slapped down by Vishinsky are among those who are learning this painful lesson.

Hostility toward the United States and distrust of some of our methods and objectives certainly still exist and continue to find expression in many of the activities at Lake Success. What is developing seems to be a feeling that, whether the United States blundered or not, it is now the UN itself which is on trial for its life; that if it does not succeed in the long run in checkmating China, it will go down the drain as the League of Nations did; and that all the resources of the non-Communist world must now be devoted to the task of making aggression so expensive no nation in the future can afford it.

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FBI AND THE LAW

The US Court of Appeals has reversed the espionage conviction of Judith Coplon on the grounds that FBI agents arrested her without a warrant and searched her purse for documents, and that the Government failed to prove that FBI wiretapping did not "lead" to any part of the evidence on which she was convicted. Although the Court said Miss Coplon's "guilt is plain," at least we have been reassured that "guilt" must still be proved by the usual legal processes.

PEGLER AND THE PEOPLE

King Features Syndicate, one of the Hearst Enterprises, has inserted a two-page advertisement in *Editor & Publisher* (December 2, 1950) attributing the spectacular Republican victories in November to the "courageous columnist Westbrook Pegler." The ad reads verbatim:

"In such key states as Pennsylvania (Pegler circ. 1,315,000); Illinois (Pegler circ. 650,000); Connecticut (Pegler circ. 200,585); and the majority of all other states the results were the same—*The people and Westbrook Pegler were amazingly close together* — convincing proof that Westbrook Pegler's courage in choosing his ground and standing firm—despite wide criticism—has now been justified by the vote of the people of the United States."

This bald claim to championship of columnar reaction is bound to nettle the latest challenger, Fulton Lewis Jr. We hope that the ensuing battle will be decided by a knockout.

PADLOCK ON TEACHERS

In the light of the growing infringement on academic freedom through teacher loyalty oaths and book censorships, Seth W. Richardson's opening speech as chairman of the new Subversive Activities Control Board was particularly unsettling. Last week Richardson told the Virginia Student Legal Forum at Charlottesville, Va., that "the first padlock" in the control of disloyalty in speech should "go on the mouths of teachers and scientists." As for dangerous thought, Richardson offered a unique test of loyalty: "The man who fears that his thinking will be curbed by a check of loyalty may be thinking things that tend to be disloyal to his country."

PROFITS AND TAXES

The dire international developments have knocked the heart out of opposition to passage of an Excess Profits Tax bill. But proponents had better not start taking victory for granted or the heart of the excess profits tax will get knocked out in a compromise.

The fight in September over the last tax bill indicates the line-up. The House, under the guiding hand of Ways and Means Committee Chairman, "Muley" Doughton (D, N.C.), passed a pretty good bill and stopped up some of the loopholes left open by the Senate. Now the House is again trying to get a good Excess Profits Tax law and the Senate is still leaning over backwards to accommodate the big corporations.

Not that the bill which passed the House last week 378 to 20 represents perfection. The steep excess profits tax rate is applied only to those profits in excess of 85 percent of a corporation's 1946-49 average rather than 75 percent as the President asked. This will lose a half-billion dollars a year. It also gives so many relief provisions to railroads that they are practically exempt. But on the whole the bill is an Administration victory.

Corporations are already taxed at a rate of 25 percent on the first $25,000 of their income and 45 percent on all income over $25,000. The House-passed Excess Profits Tax bill would add another 30 percent (for a total rate of 75 percent) on all profits in excess of 85 percent of a corporation's average earnings for the years 1946-49, excluding the lowest year. If for some reason the period 1946-49 could not be considered typical for a particular corporation, it may use the alternative capitalization method which allows a profit based on a maximum-percentage return on net worth. Numerous other technical-relief provisions have been put in the bill to make it fair and eliminate real hardship cases.

The House bill would yield an extra $3-billion annual revenue at 1950 profit levels and $4.6 billion on expected 1951 profits. It would affect about 70,000, or less than one-fifth of all corporations, this year and 80,000 in 1951.

The danger is that the Senate may reach a compromise based on combining a flat-rate increase for all corporations with a greatly softened excess profits tax. Thus conservative Senators could piously proclaim their love for the popular excess profits tax while gutting its purpose. Such a compromise would enable war profiteers to make all corporations share the taxes that they themselves should pay and would make it tough for those corporations whose profits are falling off rather than booming as a result of the war.

HERBLOCK IN THE WASHINGTON POST

Number One Boy

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OUTSIDE AMERICA

The French are the most neutralist of the European peoples. Hence, it must be primarily to them that Edgar Ansel Mowrer refers in his new book, *Challenge and Decision,* when he writes:

> Average foreigners hanker for the American way of life. But outside the United States average citizens still generally accept as "best" not what they personally prefer (for being relatively uneducated, how can they know?) but what their intellectuals tell them is best. When the latter tell them that the USA and the USSR are uncultured countries, both pursuing the same purely material ends, the masses are impressed and listen to those who advocate "neutrality" in the "purely Russian-American conflict."

The notion of the French "masses" as "relatively uneducated" has a more than usually unwelcome flavor of patronizing condescension for the fact that it is set forth in a context in which an American intellectual explains how to "sell" learning to the benighted Europeans. It happens also that neutralism is widespread among "average" men and women not only in France, but in West Germany, the Low Countries and Scandinavia as well.

Moreover, one of the other shortcomings of the advice which some American intellectuals are now giving their Government about how to "win" or "buy" the support of the European masses is that it tends to be based on the psychological situation of 10 or 20 years ago. The Europeans' very real desire for improvement in *their* material way of life is no longer (if it ever was) hankering for the American way. The Europeans are concerned not with the "best" but with the possible; and if their views of the possible seem at times impractically or even cravenly escapist, it is because—and the fact had better be faced squarely—they are more interested in survival than in freedom and in peace rather than victory. The notion that neutralism results only from the influence of the intellectuals is part of a myth about the Europeans which is being created by American intellectuals whose "manipulation of symbols" is prewar.

The fact is that there are now two different kinds of neutralism in Western Europe, and neither has much to do with the old-fashioned tendency of Europeans to hold up to contempt America's culture or presumed lack of it. The first is the simply and brutally blood-and-guts feeling of ordinary men and women that so long as there is *any* chance whatsoever of maintaining *any* way of life, it should be seized in preference to any step, no matter how noble and fine and glorious, that must lead through war to a *better* way of life. The European past is too unpleasantly close to make men sacrifice their present to a better future.

Mowrer also writes:

> Once we start carrying out the Great Policy we shall need only to make it known in order to hearten our friends, win over neutrals, comfort the captives and dismay our enemies. For the Great Policy contains most of what the people of our day are seeking: An end of Soviet Communist aggression through the rapid formation of a Peace Coalition with preponderant physical power. A recognition of the national economic aspirations of all people that join the Coalition. An American offer of membership in a worldwide federation open to all law-abiding countries. And, last, future co-operation by the United States in worldwide economic rehabilitation once real peace has been re-established.

A very large number of ordinary Europeans dread that last phrase. They have had two experiences in a generation with the "re-establishment" of peace; and though the one they now have may not be real enough to satisfy American intellectuals, they prefer it to policies and coalitions with capital letters. Most of these Europeans will, though without enthusiasm, agree to contribute to the preponderation of America's power; but since their share in real power must perforce be small, they will offer sales resistance to the hawkers of a faith and purpose highly favored in the current American propaganda but unattractive to Europeans without the currency — material or moral — to permit buying a better future on margin.

The second neutralism is of the intellectuals who want to save not so much their physical selves as the ideas—expressed in social, political and moral forms—for which they stand. Their present complaint is not that the Americans are materialistic, uncultured, uneducated (relatively or otherwise); it is that the Americans are emotionally unstable, hence dangerous or at least undependable as political mentors and military *condottieri.*

Sir Harold Spencer Jones, the British Royal Astronomer and anything but a fellow traveler, referred recently to the United States as "a country where mass hysteria is rather prevalent." And the kind of American news which Europeans *now* consider more illuminating about American life than anything put out by the Voice of America or the USIS is the story of the boy in the Bronx who produced a panic by a fake broadcast about an invasion of the "enemy."

Of course, Sir Harold's view, already widely held by men on his intellectual level, also percolates down to the "relatively uneducated" masses and tends to create a new myth about the Americans, and this in turn gives a false rationality to the lower and broader currents of neutralism. The open and covert enemies of America who find it increasingly difficult to spread the notion of America's selfishness and wickedness are given a chance to exploit another aspect of the American way of life by offering statistics of the number of psychoanalysts and the proportion of beds in the magnificent hospitals used for the numerous cases of emotional, nervous or mental illnesses.

If American realities are to be effective factors in helping strengthen a trans-Atlantic community, American "education" of the Europeans had better be directed toward unmaking rather than making myths — and in simple, clear, reasonable language, not in the rhetoric of capital-lettered and anachronistic symbol-manipulating propaganda.

PERCY WINNER

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THE CRISIS IN EUROPE

OUR LINES are crumbling in Korea. Our soldiers are hard-pressed. Decisions must be made at once in Korea that affect all Asia and all our lives. Naturally, our attention is turned to Asia. Yet, in Europe equally grave decisions face us. In Europe, also, time is running out.

Two years have elapsed since the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) first began to talk about rearmament, but the actual state of defense preparedness in continental Western Europe is not much better now than when the Treaty was under negotiation in the winter of 1948. Some preliminary decisions have been made; some defense plans have been drawn up on paper; some increased production of weapons is under way in Europe; some munitions and supplies have been delivered by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). There have been many meetings of the NATO Council, many journeys of foreign ministers, defense ministers and chiefs-of-staff, back and forth across the Atlantic, innumerable conferences of military and economic specialists, an endless proliferation of NATO committees, working parties, study groups and "task forces." But the number of trained and equipped divisions and air groups actually in being in Western Europe, the amount of defense funds actually appropriated by European governments and the size of the defense production contracts actually negotiated by European procurement authorities are not significantly larger than they were two years ago. Nor is a larger effort in sight. How many troops will each nation raise? How shall these troops be equipped, and who shall produce and pay for the necessary munitions and supplies? What should Western Germany contribute? These basic decisions, which must precede a rational rearmament effort, have yet to be made.

The plain truth is that Western Europe is still virtually defenseless. Except for the half-dozen or so American and British divisions in Western Germany, there is apparently nothing on the Continent which could prevent the Soviet armies from marching to the English Channel in a matter of weeks.

Nor is there much evidence, except in Britain, that the people of Western Europe as yet have the will to defend themselves or to bear the sacrifices necessary to make their countries defensible. Anyone who has had the opportunity over the past few months to observe the ordinary people on the Continent—workers, farmers and shopkeepers—cannot but be struck by the mounting fear and confusion, the apathy and cynicism, the hopelessness and opportunism which characterized the already-low state of European morale even before Korea.

This failure of nerve, this pervasive social and political disintegration, lies behind the almost pathological reaction on the Continent to the Chinese intervention in Korea—the pathetic cry for appeasement of the aggressors, for a "deal" with the Russians, the desperate talk of European neutrality or of creating at the eleventh hour an independent "Third Force" to keep the balance between the United States and the USSR. This demoralization permeates all groups from Left to Right, socialists as well as businessmen, Labourites and Conservatives, Christian Democrats and anti-clerical Liberals. It is a major element in the recent defeats of the Adenauer Government, in the sea of troubles which threaten the Pleven Government and even in the current anti-rearmament movement within the British Labour Party.

These symptoms of the developing European crisis are all the more alarming in view of the increasingly-menacing and well-coordinated actions of the Communist front. The North Koreans stretch us out in Korea; the Chinese strike throughout all Asia. The Chinese stretch us out in Asia; the Soviets or their satellites prepare to strike in Western Europe.

Our best troops are caught in Korea. We are deeply committed to save the Koreans, liberated by the UN, from torture and revenge and to halt now the bandwagon that will roll across Asia and within China itself if the Chinese Communists drive the UN forces from the peninsula. Yet, a moment's reflection will demonstrate that the main objective in the first phase of any general conflict between the Communist bloc and the Free World must be to retain the industrial capacity, the trained labor force, the technological and scientific skill and the rich cultural tradition of Western Europe. Western Europe's coal and steel production is greater than Russia's; its metal working capacity is several times larger; its industrial labor force is more numerous, more highly skilled and more productive. With these European resources fully mobilized on our side, we could certainly prevent further Communist aggression. We might be strong enough to free countries already under the Soviet yoke. But without Western Europe's industrial capacity and manpower, it is doubtful whether we could successfully defend even the Western Hemisphere. Once Russia controlled the mines and factories of Germany, France, Italy and Belgium, the odds would shift in favor of an ultimate Communist triumph.

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The purpose of this series of articles is to suggest why the state of Western Europe's defenses is so appallingly inadequate and how Europeans can achieve the means and the will to defend themselves.

The Dilemma of Rearmament

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was formally signed in Washington by the representatives of the United States, Canada and the major Western European nations. For some time before that date, discussions had been going on among the military staffs of the member nations. These informal groups were regularized and brought within the framework of the permanent organization (NATO) established by the Treaty. The main activities of the organization center in the committee of deputies of the foreign ministers, who meet continuously in London and report quarterly to the NATO Council, composed of the foreign ministers; and the Military Committee which reports regularly to a committee of the defense ministers.

For the past 18 months, these NATO groups have been trying to reach agreement on the size and composition of the forces required to defend the North Atlantic area, the cost of raising, equipping and maintaining these forces and the contribution in men, money and production which each member nation shall make to the common defense. Also, they have devised embryonic command and liaison arrangements for directing and co-ordinating these forces once they come into being.

General Eisenhower, when he is finally appointed Supreme Commander, will find at least the nucleus of a general staff already organized. But whether the Supreme Commander will find more than a handful of trained and equipped divisions and air groups to command is another matter. It is his continental contingent, which must eventually provide the bulk of his ground forces, that is and will probably continue to be the most seriously deficient.

Why is it that NATO has as yet been unable to decide on the shares of the defense burden which each nation must assume? Why is it that, except for Britain, none of the European member governments are as yet willing or able to propose to their Parliaments the legislation required for raising the men and money needed for defense of Western Europe? Why, two years after planning for rearmament first began and almost six months after the Korean crisis made the aggressive intentions of the Soviets so unmistakably clear, has so little actually been accomplished on the Continent?

The apparent reasons are not hard to find. Most obvious is the persistent economic weakness of most of the continental economies despite successes in restoring the prewar production levels and standards of living.

In theory, this decided improvement in Europe's economic position and prospects leaves some margin of resources which can be devoted to rearmament. The major continental states should certainly be able to devote at least 10 percent of their national income to defense purposes without unduly-serious effects on their civilian standards of living, on the really useful core of their investment programs or on their dollar-export drives. In fact, however, the problem is much more difficult. Except in Britain, none of the West European governments seem to possess the authority, prestige and basic public support required for an internal mobilization effort. Governments too weak to collect existing taxes can hardly increase taxes and curtail less essential government expenditures in order to finance rearmament. The task is made harder because budgets are already overburdened with sacrosanct expenditures such as large investment programs, growing social services and the persistent deficits of nationalized industries.

To finance the necessary defense expenditures by noninflationary government borrowing appears to be equally difficult. Outside of Scandinavia, the purchase of government bonds is no longer a recognized form of private savings on the Continent. If the continental governments resort to central bank advances and other forms of inflationary borrowing—politically the easiest way to finance increased defense expenditures—the resulting pressures will undoubtedly renew the postwar inflations so painfully and precariously brought under control with the Marshall Plan.

The truth is that the economic gains of the Marshall Plan, while extraordinary and important, are nonetheless superficial and probably temporary. Hardly a start has been made toward overcoming Western Europe's long-term, fundamental economic weaknesses—the maldistribution of national income and the inability to sustain satisfactory growth in productivity. Historically, Europe's gradual economic stagnation over the past half-century is a direct result of the increasing constriction of economic life within narrow national boundaries and of the stifling of initiative and enterprise within diminutive and noncompetitive home markets. The small, increasingly isolated and autarchic national economies have failed to provide incentives and pressures necessary for economic growth.

Decay in the social and political fields has been equally deep-seated and persistent. The decay of social cohesion, the decline of political loyalties and the military defenselessness so apparent today in continental Western Europe are all aspects of the failure of national morale. Events since the start of the Korean War have shown that the

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recovery of living standards under the Marshall Plan has brought no significant improvement in morale. Hundreds of thousands of European Communists watch their leaders hauled off to Moscow to receive instructions without any sense of humiliation. Desertions from the Communist Party have not meant accretions of strength for the democratic parties. Adherents of all parties have drifted increasingly into apathy, cyncism and indifference—into a political limbo from which none of the current ideologies seems capable of rousing them. The reason is that the nineteenth-century European states are not able to cope with the rigorous conditions of the mid-twentieth. The national states of the Continent have long since ceased to provide the scope and stimulus necessary for continued economic growth. Politically, they can no longer evoke sufficient unanimity to support vigorous or stable party governments. Socially, they no longer infuse national cohesion, inspire mass loyalties or enjoy popular respect. The people of the Continent, particularly the citizens of the larger states—France, Germany, Italy—are painfully aware that their national greatness is behind them; that they have ceased, through their governments, to control their own national destinies; that, overshadowed by the two giants of the East and West, they no longer possess the economic strength, the political prestige or the military might necessary for playing an independent role in world affairs. Their one strong conviction is that neither Communism nor the existing system of moribund national states provides the hope or inspiration to justify the sacrifices involved.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the national governments on the Continent have accomplished so little toward making Western Europe defensible. Nor have the tactics followed by the United States been of decisive help to them in overcoming their difficulties.

The US Government has tried in three ways to induce the Europeans to rearm: by exhortation and diplomatic pressure primarily in NATO; by the offer of material aid, both in the form of finished munitions and of dollars, to finance the import of commodities needed for munitions productions in Europe; and by the commitment of American divisions and air groups to the defense of Western Europe.

The first of these methods is effective only to the extent that the other two methods are capable of removing the difficulties confronting the Europeans, and need not be discussed independently. As to the provision of United States material aid, although the amounts so far appropriated by the Congress or contemplated by the Administration are huge by any previous "peacetime" standard, they are nevertheless small in comparison with the estimated total cost of making Western Europe defensible. Aid of this type has hitherto been distributed to European countries on a day-to-day emergency basis. This Government has been understandably reluctant to make any long-term commitments until it knew how much of the rearmament burden the nations of Western Europe were willing to finance. Those countries, in turn, have been equally reluctant to volunteer any targets for themselves until given firm assurances of the amounts of American aid they would receive. The resulting impasse only now seems to be breaking under the impact of the UN defeats in Korea. But the totals of what the Europeans are prepared to spend themselves and what the United States is able to give are still likely to be significantly smaller than the amounts required for adequate European rearmament.

This difficulty reveals the fatal weakness of the overreliance on material aid as the main lever of American foreign policy. Since World War II, the State Department has labored under the misconception that it could buy anything with American dollars, even morale—if only the amounts spent were large enough. In this case, it is apparent that we cannot bear more than a small part of the burden of rearming Europe, in view of the mounting financial requirements of the war in the Far East and the need to build up our reserves as quickly as possible. But even if we could afford to finance all, or a large part, of Europe's rearmament expenditures, unless continental morale is vastly improved, it would be unrealistic to expect continental troops to put up any better resistance to the Soviet armies than did their predecessors in withstanding the Nazi onslaught in 1940. Important as high morale is to the civilian population it is even more important to soldiers who must have a steady faith in their leaders and their government and a firm conviction that they are risking death for something worth defending. A fighting faith is particularly essential for troops who face the material superiority and disregard of human life which Russian armies will undoubtedly possess in as great degree as do the North Korean and Chinese.

The Europeans are unlikely to defend themselves unless and until they are convinced that they have something both worth defending and capable of being defended, yet the urgent and imperative need to rearm quickly has, among other factors, prevented the adoption of solutions which might create a new European morale. The methods pursued by the United States to induce Europeans to rearm adequately touch only the surface of the difficulty.

The next article in this series will discuss the chief measures, particularly those proposed by the French, which offer some prospect of transforming European morale and saving Europe for the Free World.

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THE SABRA: JEW WITH ROOTS

by Alfred Werner

A STATE of undeclared war exists between Tel Aviv and the hinterland, which I might call Israel's backwoods were it not for the fact that stones are more plentiful there than trees. Immediately upon your arrival at the Lydda Airport, you will hear one of the handsomely-built boys or girls in khaki say defiantly, "Tel Aviv is not Israel." Look sharply at the soldier or soldierette who talks that way: he or she is most probably a Sabra, one of those second- or third-generation Israelis who constitute a new type of Jew.

Greater Tel Aviv, a European city where about one-third of the nation is living, was built by Bauhaus architects in a monotonous functionalist style. It would be ugly except for the almost tropical flora partially covering its nakedness. The 350,000 residents who rush about with heavy briefcases, crowd the buses, or sip a gazoz in one of the countless cafes are certainly Israeli citizens. But few of them are Israelis. They are Jews transferred from cosmopolitan Berlin, Vienna, Prague or Budapest to an austere little country which, before Hitler's rise to power, was nothing but a geographic term to them.

A few miles outside Tel Aviv (or the smaller Haifa and Jerusalem) begins Sabraland—the real Israel, as many claim. The rulers of these rural regions are the Sabras, a nickname derived from the wild-growing reddish fruit of the cactus plant, known to be sweet and good despite its rough appearance.

These people are the Palestine-born children and grandchildren of refugees who have been streaming into Israel for the past 70 years. (Before 1880, only a few ultra-orthodox people were living at Jerusalem, Tiberias and Safed in almost medieval circumstances. Many of the Sabras, stemming from this particular group, have purposely isolated themselves from the new "unholy" state because it does not follow Talmudic tradition.) Israel's Pilgram Fathers are, in a sense, those 20 young, educated "Lovers of Zion" who trekked from Tsarist Russia to the Holy Land in 1882. Between that date and the start of World War I, thousands of additional refugees poured into the new homeland from Russia, from Rumania and Galicia, producing the bulk of the Sabra generation.

Unlike the more recent refugees from the big Central European cities, they were ignorant of agriculture and unused to the hot climate. They were plagued by Oriental diseases, harassed by Bedouins and wild animals. Yet they stayed on and founded Rishon-le-Zion, Gedera, Rosh Pinah and other settlements that are now the backbone and pride of the new Republic, thus creating a homeland where they could grow up emotionally uncrippled by anti-Semitism.

Let us consider Avram, an average Sabra born in Palestine in 1910, based in large part on an Israel acquaintance of mine. After his parents had fled to the Promised Land from a pogrom staged in their little Ukrainian town by the reactionary League of the Russian People, they became members of a farming community in Galilee and raised a family. Avram's childhood was far from quiet. During World War I the Jewish farmers were cruelly oppressed by the Turkish Generalissimo, Djemal Pasha, who suspected them of espionage on behalf of the Allied Powers. The Turks confiscated their arms so that the Galilean village became a prey to Arab marauders and looters. For a time, the whole settlement was "evacuated" to Syria. Avram's father was pressed into the Ottoman army, but he escaped and returned to Palestine as a soldier in the Jewish Legion that helped General Allenby clear the country of Turkish troops and bring to an end the hated Ottoman regime.

When Avram was about 16, no one had to persuade him that it was necessary to join the Hagannah, or Defense Corps. He was a junior member of a kibbutz (collective farm) when he got his first idea of what warfare was like; in 1929 the Arabs, whipped up by the Mufti of Jerusalem, suddenly attacked Jewish settlements all over the country, and Avram's farm was the first one to suffer casualties. It was in the spring of 1936 that the fatal shot was fired in Jaffa that precipitated what was virtually a 12-years' war.

Avram fought the British when they tried to stop the "illegal" immigration. But he also fought under them when that unforgettable idealist and pro-Zionist, Orde Wingate, organized and drilled what was the nucleus of the forthcoming Israel army. In 1948, during the war of liberation, he was wounded in the battle for Acco. Among the 120 defenders who held his farm collective against a large Egyptian force for several weeks, until the Armistice, were his wife and son. Decorated for bravery, Avram returned to his kibbutz and his family after the cessation of hostilities. Avram's son has become a soldier in the regular army and his daughter a nurse in an army hospital.

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The Sabra will baffle you in his physical features and mental and emotional make-up. He is generally taller than his parents and grandparents. A large percentage of Sabras look as "Nordic" as any group of Danes or Norwegians, due to the fact that they stem chiefly from Eastern European groups in which fair-haired and blue-eyed types are frequent.

Men and women alike treat each other as comrades with little regard to sex. Promiscuity is frowned upon, and rare. Likewise, the elaborate system of flirtation is practiced very little. Whenever a man and woman wish to live together, the community provides them with private living quarters. Shortly before the first child arrives, a rabbi is called from the city, to insure the legitimacy of the offspring. For, though most Israelis resent it, there are no provisions for civil marriage; hence some kind of religious officiation is obligatory.

With a few exceptions, the Sabra is anti-intellectual because he rejects his father, or grandfather, for having spent endless hours in "shul" (the synagogue), or the university, strengthening his brains at the expense of his body. The Sabra knows only that he fought the Arabs with sten guns and bombs; he thinks that he alone won the war of 1948 and forgets that half the war was won by his people's smartly-dressed, smooth diplomats at Washington and Lake Success.

Still, the Sabra is a fascinating new type of Jew, a unique phenomenon in his baffling originality. You can be sure that he will not hesitate to risk his life again and again for his land. Without grumbling, he tightens his belt to share his ration with every new immigrant. He will be the last to engage in smuggling, black marketeering or any of the illegal practices that are common in Tel Aviv.

The Sabras have been maligned by Arthur Koestler who, in his novel, *Thieves in the Night,* referred to them as a "horde of Hebrew Tarzans," whereas more recently Thomas Sugrue in *Watch for the Morning* hailed them as people who are freer than the Jews he has met in the United States, more secure in themselves and less apt to regard Gentiles with fear. The fact is that the Sabra has still to grow.

WANTED: A BLUEPRINT

by Robert R. Nathan

IT WILL soon be six months since the war started in Korea. The daring action of President Truman in promptly committing our fighting men received almost universal support throughout the country. During this entire period, US forces have been engaged in combat. Most of the time we were on the defensive, and public opinion was strongly behind a rapid acceleration in mobilization of our manpower and productive resources. Yet, there is serious question whether the mobilization program developed at home has properly paralleled military activities on the fighting front.

If we have failed to make the necessary progress in mobilizing our vast resources in support of our fighting forces, why have we failed? What has gone wrong? What lessons have we learned which may help us in the difficult days ahead?

It is not a simple and overnight task to expand our total productive capacity and to divert our raw materials and machinery and manpower from peacetime production to military production. There is no magic formula which changes an automobile factory on a moment's notice into a plant producing airplanes or into a tank arsenal. We found that out during the initial war period in the early forties. It really was not until well into 1943 that the peak level of armament production was reached in the United States.

Allowing for all the difficulties and problems, progress this time has been far less than it should have been. Certainly, more progress was made in the first six months of mobilization this year than in the same length of time in 1940. But we should be able to move faster and more effectively because of the very benefits of the relatively recent war-production experience. More important, in 1940 the United States was at peace and had only some kind of an indefinite goal of providing assistance to those who were resisting the aggression of the German Armies. This time the US has been engaged in actual combat right from the start and has had, or at least should have had, some reasonable ideas of our political and military objectives. There is little basis for self-congratulation and complacency because we may have done a little better than we did before.

Statistics are not available on armament production, month by month, so it is not known exactly what has happened to the curve of military output. Figures on the output of finished items would not be important anyhow in the very early months of mobilization. Much more important is the evidence of actions taken to step up production substantially next month, in three months, in

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six months or a year hence. What is the progress on setting objectives, securing appropriations, placing contracts, initiating conversion of plants, expanding productive capacity, stockpiling strategic materials, preparing control techniques and developing effective governmental organizations and personnel? Surely, against such criteria, we have not done very well.

The most important single factor behind our lagging effort has been the persistent absence of a schedule or program of needs. We have not had any real goals—no reasonably specific set of requirements.

No one can say that progress has been lacking because Stuart Symington and his associates in the National Security Resources Board have been unwilling to push vigorously in support of military production. Symington is as ardent and determined a supporter of bigger military production as one can find anywhere in Washington. There is much room for improvement throughout the mobilization agencies, but no matter how perfect they might have been, their efforts would have been limited by the absence of a program of military needs.

The problem of setting target goals is by no means abstract or theoretical. Requirements must precede appropriations. Orders cannot be placed with industry until the money is appropriated. Factories are never made ready for military production until the orders are placed. Expansion of new capacity takes lots of time. Civilian output must be curtailed in tune with expanding war production. Mobilization is not an easy job, and it all depends on military requirements.

It is high time for our top military, political and economic strategists to reach agreement on a program of requirements which will give us the basis for a really effective mobilization program. Certainly, those in charge of our international policies must have a fairly clear idea by now of what our political commitments are and might be. It should be possible for our top military strategists to translate these political commitments into total military requirements. Then through co-operative effort, the military strategists and the production staff should be able to lay out some kind of a time schedule for the fulfillment of these objectives—a schedule which will be both ambitious and feasible.

Of course, no one knows *precisely* what our requirements will be 6 months or 18 months from now. Conditions will change. Nonetheless, we certainly must have some idea now of what we need. For instance, how many men do we need in uniform? Should we be building a military machine of two, three or five million men at this time? Having decided on the total goal, the time schedule of recruitment can be determined on the basis of organizational facilities and equipment limitations. Through the close and working co-operation of those who decide what is needed and those who know what can be accomplished under a vigorous effort, some time schedule of manpower mobilization can certainly be developed. The same can be done for armament.

Should we be shooting for the production of 500 planes a month in the middle of 1951, or the end of 1951? Or should we be shooting for 2,000 planes a month in the middle of next year? These questions can be answered within a reasonable range of accuracy. It was done before, and it can be done again.

The production planners, by working daily with the military strategists, can set up time schedules, goals or objectives month by month, or quarter by quarter or half-year by half-year. Having such goals scheduled out in the future, we will then understand how big the job is, and what's going to be needed in terms of expansion of facilities, conversion of facilities, curtailment of civilian production and consumption or the types of measures to fight inflation. Without such goals, we are working in the dark. The main problem appears to be the lack of objectives which, more importantly than any other factor, explains our lagging mobilization effort.

Military spending has been increasing at a snail's pace. President Truman, some time ago, stated that we would be spending at an annual rate of $30 billion for military purposes by the middle of 1951. The way we are now going, it is likely that military spending will not reach, let alone exceed, an annual rate of $25 billion by next June. Obviously, military spending is not an end goal in itself, but it is the important measure and reflection of the number of men in uniform and of the flow of armaments out of our factories. On the basis of scattered information about scheduled inductions of new men into the armed forces and fragmentary reports on orders already placed for military procurement, progress is likely to continue to be very slow for some months. Not only are we not reaping satisfactory end results now, but we are not laying the groundwork for satisfactory end results three months or six months or a year from now.

American industry demonstrated during World War II that, once it is given the orders for military production, it can do an amazing job. Of course, many employers are enjoying such outstanding prosperity in meeting civilian demand that they are not particularly anxious or willing to take military orders. That can be readily overcome. The real truth of the matter is that the volume of orders placed to date has been so small as hardly to challenge American industry.

In traveling around the country and talking with businessmen, one finds that an amazingly small propor-

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tion of American factories has received orders for military production. Maybe there has not been enough speed in ordering or aggressiveness in forcing business to take orders, but that is not where the major difficulty lies. Until now, there have not been clear-cut, ambitious requirements, and appropriations have not been large enough to call for an effective, though partial, mobilization of our productive capacity.

We do not need an all-out, total mobilization in order to get going. Actually, we can have rapid *partial* mobilization just as we can have rapid *total* mobilization. At present price levels and with existing facilities plus selective expansion, a peak rate of military spending of around $150 billion a year could probably be reached. Such a goal has not been set, and it is hoped that total mobilization will not be necessary. One might question whether we can reach a $40-billion annual rate of military spending as quickly as we could a total objective of $150 billion a year. Perhaps, the speed and degree of acceleration cannot be so great if our objective is smaller, but it need not be much slower.

When total military appropriations slightly in excess of $30 billion were enacted last summer, lots of people thought that most of this would be spent in fiscal year 1951. Actually, some of that money is for planes and tanks and other items which will not be delivered until well into 1952 and probably even into 1953. There may be no actual production of some finished items by the end of the current fiscal year. It takes time to tool up and to convert present facilities and to build new ones. That is all the more reason why there has to be a schedule of requirements and appropriations and contracts projecting well into the future.

Unless, and until, we have a set of objectives, tentative as they may be and subject to revision, precious weeks and months will be wasted in costly dillydallying. We certainly will not go all-out in the expansion program for more steel and aluminum and copper without a set of military requirements. We have already heard the same old story by the leaders of the steel industry that military requirements are taking an extremely small proportion of total steel production and will continue to take a relatively limited supply so that the industry need not worry about any major expansion. The same is going to be said by other critical bottleneck industries. Likewise, unless our goals are clear, conservation programs and anti-inflationary measures will represent only halfway steps which will not do the job. We are wasting valuable time, and we are going to continue to waste time until the country is given a set of ambitious goals toward which we know we have to work hard and effectively.

How are these goals going to be established? Actually, in World War II it was not until President Roosevelt himself determined upon a set of objectives that we went all-out in our mobilization effort. Many military and production people looked upon President Roosevelt's objectives as something fantastic and unachievable and unrealistic. All of those objectives were not achieved, but they did give the country something to shoot at, and without them we never would have gone so fast and so far in producing the armaments which were so essential for winning World War II.

In World War II, there was no organizational set-up in which the production experts and the military experts ever sat down together to arrive at goals which were both feasible and ambitious. Now we do have such a mechanism in the National Security Council. Mr. Symington, who is the top man in production, is also a member of the National Security Council. President Truman should call upon this Council, working in the closest co-operation with the State Department, the National Security Resources Board and the National Production Authority, to arrive at a set of requirements both consistent with our political commitments and production possibilities.

This is not an easy job to achieve, but it is achievable. It will depend on the State Department and the Defense Department and the National Security Resources Board staffs working as a team, day by day and hour by hour. Such a program is not going to fall out of a clear sky. It is going to take lots of brain work and paper work and really intensive effort. Success is not going to be achieved overnight, nor is it going to be achieved at all unless President Truman calls for the job to be done and insists on the necessary co-ordination for doing it.

The development of a schedule of military requirements will not solve all our problems. But it will clarify the issues and provide the basis for intelligent policies and programs all along the line. The requirements will have to be known of essential industries such as electric power, railroads, petroleum and all public utilities. Expansion goals will have to be established in basic industries, and the material and equipment needs for such expansion must be fixed. A program of export needs will have to be determined in line with our Marshall Plan and Point IV objectives. The needs for the maintenance and repair of farm and industrial facilities must be known. A schedule of minimum consumer needs should be prepared in case of all-out mobilization. Then, policies and controls essential for fulfilling these objectives will have to be worked out. It all adds up to a very big job, but the need for a schedule of military requirements is first on the list.

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HAROLD L. ICKES: *The Supreme Court Takes Refuge*

It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court refused to hear arguments in the Dollar Ship Line case. With their company on the verge of bankruptcy, they had turned, in desperation, to the US Maritime Commission. The assets of the company had been dissipated by excessive withdrawals in the way of salaries, commissions and other emoluments. The company owed some $7 million to the Government. For this the Dollar Company and R. Stanley Dollar were liable.

The Dollars sold their stock to the Maritime Commission. Under the Commission, the line paid off all debts and built a large surplus where, before, only a deficit had grown. And then, may it please the taxpayers, the Dollars had the nerve to claim that they had not sold their stock; they had only pledged it. The US District Court decided in favor of the Government. The US Court of Appeals for the District reversed this decision. An appeal by the Government to the Supreme Court to hear the case has been categorically refused without comment.

By refusing to hear the case the Supreme Court adopted the conclusions of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Yet, the reasoning of that court was curious. In negotiating with the Maritime Commission, it was clear that Dollar intended to *sell* his stock. He said so. He wrote a letter to his broker saying that he no longer owned it. In the sure belief that he had sold his interest, as he intended, Dollar took a capital loss—probably a large one—on his subsequent income tax return. If ever a corpse had been embalmed and laid away under six feet of earth, it was the decrepit Dollar Line.

Then the US Circuit Court of Appeals, followed by the Supreme Court, said, in effect, to Dollar: "Tush, tush, my boy, you may have believed that you were selling your stock, but you were doing no such thing. Even if you thought so, you should not have said so. As a businessman of long experience, you may have had the queer notion that a business transaction is what the parties concerned think that it is and want it to be. But you were wrong. Despite everything that you have said and done to indicate that you sold your stock in the Dollar Line to the Maritime Commission, you did something else. You merely pledged it, and now that the Government has paid all of the debts that you contracted and built up assets of some $60 million, you may have it all back without a 'thank you.' No one will be hurt except the taxpayers, and they are used to being milked."

In effect, since the Supreme Court refused *certiorari* in the case, this is what our highest court has said also. It is easy to understand why the US Supreme Court, whose prestige is based upon the respect and confidence of the people, would rather not say in so many words what the Court of Appeals already had said. This being true, the course that was followed is understandable. The Supreme Court blandly refused to take the case, thereby escaping the embarrassment that it might have suffered if it had felt called upon to follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and hold that Mr. Dollar was as wrong as he could be when he said that he had sold property which, by dint of some legal mumbo-jumbo, he had merely pledged. It was smart of the Supreme Court to hide behind a jigsaw opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals. After all, few people were likely to comprehend verbal tight-rope walking which implied that a man may intend to sell, and want to sell, property without being able to do it or that he may even announce that he has sold, as well as enjoyed the benefits of the transaction, and, notwithstanding, a court years later may hold that the seller in fact had done something entirely different from what he had intended to do.

It is rare indeed when a man can repossess property worth more than $60 million by bare-faced reneging on a deal he had made to save his financial hide. For a court to sanction such skullduggery does not induce public confidence. Shrewdly, Dollar went to extreme pains to hire the "right" lawyers. This Californian forayed into Missouri to retain a counsel of unknown special qualifications, a former partner of Democratic National Chairman, Bill Boyle. Himself a reactionary Republican, Dollar was eager to employ Democratic lawyers who were friends of friends of Democratic tycoons or of members of the Circuit Court of Appeals. He came to Washington where he was introduced to Democratic leaders. He contributed Republican money to help the Democratic cause. Perhaps, he will offer to repay the Government, with interest, the $7 million that he once owed it. Undoubtedly, he will lose no time in asking the Collector of Internal Revenue to revise the return upon which he took the capital loss on his Dollar stock. If he was not selling his stock, although he intended to, but was merely pledging it as he later persuaded himself, there could not have been a capital loss.

The Dollar Ship Line case was one that the Supreme Court might well have accepted. The people of the United States were entitled to hear from the court directly on the important issues involved.

HAROLD L. ICKES

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

HISTORY IN A PRESIDENT'S LETTERS

by Ralph McGill

ON NOVEMBER 12, 1928, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Governor of New York, sent a telegram from Warm Springs, Georgia, to Louis M. Howe, initiating plans to rebuild the Democratic Party, shattered in the elections of that year. On April 9, 1945, from the same address, Franklin D. Roosevelt, four times President of the United States, wrote a brief note to Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy, saying that he planned to attend the United Nations Conference in San Francisco and therefore would be unable to see him for several weeks. Three days later Roosevelt died at the Little White House.

F.D.R: HIS PERSONAL LETTERS, 1929-1945. Edited by Elliott Roosevelt and Joseph P. Lash (Duell, Sloan and Pearce; 2 vols., $10).

The two messages open and close what is one of the most fascinating books of our time: *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*. The entries are arranged chronologically, and as they march through the years the reader is pulled along with them. It is almost as if one were given a seat inside FDR's mind. They reveal his astonishing background of knowledge and information. They let us see how great projects began and developed. They allow us to understand his genius for getting along with people. They permit one to know, and not merely surmise, that he had a gift of intuition. And, finally, they present to the reader the picture of one of the most versatile, active and hard-working Presidents we have had. Only Lincoln's years of labor can match Roosevelt's, and his were cut short by murder.

Letters that would involve national security or international relationships and those containing the more candid of his comments about political figures still living are omitted. Like the Lincoln letters, they must remain for the future. As Mrs. Roosevelt says in a foreword, the chief value of the letters has been "to show the preparation and development which equipped Franklin Delano Roosevelt to deal with the responsibilities and circumstances of his life. Whether in your opinion he did well or ill, it is still interesting to see the background that formed his character and the influences which shaped his actions for the future."

All the great, and many of the small, personalities of those years are in these letters; he wrote to kings, queens, emperors, dictators, prime ministers, generals and the hundreds of plain, average persons who touched his life. To any but the most closed of minds, these letters give the lie to many rumors, assumptions and charges made by his enemies. The reasons he did certain things in certain ways are revealed in his correspondence. And certainly his mind was clear and strong and his zest for life great to the last moment of it. The letters demonstrate that the image the people formed of FDR in the years of his presidency was the true one. There was no plotting for a third term. Roosevelt indicates at every turn his determination to open the Government to more, rather than less, participation by the people. There was no sinister plan to draw Japan into an attack upon us.

His hopes were high after Yalta. He felt, he wrote his wife, a little exhausted, but "am really all right." But he was not blind to events. He noted, in a letter of March 16, the first instance of Soviet violation of the Yalta agreement when Russia insisted that the Lublin Government, consisting only of Communists, represent Poland at San Francisco. On March 24, he sent a personal message to Stalin urging that Molotov be sent to the San Francisco conference, stating frankly that his absence would be interpreted as Soviet lack of interest in the great objectives to be outlined there.

In the light of US-Soviet relationships today, his hopes appear ill-founded, but the letters show the grounds on which they were developed. In a letter to Thomas W. Lamont, in 1942, he tells a story "never yet committed to paper," as follows:

> In the Autumn of 1933, when I initiated with Stalin the question of renewing diplomatic relations, Litvinoff was sent over and we had a four- or five-day drag-down and knock-out fight in regard to a number of things, including the right to have American priests, ministers and rabbis look after the spiritual needs of Americans in Russia.
>
> Finally, after further objections on Litvinoff's part, I threw up my hands and said to him, "What is the use of all this anyway? Your people and my people are as far apart as the poles."
>
> Litvinoff's answer is worthy of an eventual place in history. He said, "I hope you will not feel that way, Mr. President, because I do not. In 1920, we were as far apart as you say. At that time you were one hundred percent capitalistic and we were at the other extreme —zero. In these thirteen years we have risen in the scale to, let us say, a position of twenty. You Americans, especially since last March, have gone to a position of eighty. It is my real belief that in the next twenty years we will go to forty and you will come down to sixty. I do not believe the rapprochement will get closer than that. And while it is difficult for nations to confer with and understand each other with a difference between twenty and eighty, it is wholly possible for them to do so if the difference is only between forty and sixty."

It is obvious that this comment, among other things of like nature, was in his mind as all through the war he sought to work out a program with the Russians and, as later, he believed it possible to make them a co-operating partner in the UN.

There are, of course, letters on reforestation, on the TVA, on soil conservation and many of his other reforms that now are firmly written into the laws and the thinking of all Americans. The

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wide range of his interests is amazing. He wrote about stamps, history, ships, books, paintings, the family, Harvard, Groton, a wartime gift of English gin, movies and sports.

He liked jokes and he had fun making small bets on horses whose names intrigued him. Once he won 70 cents on a horse called Naval Cadet. Anything having to do with the Navy attracted him and the letters show how close a check he kept on its development.

Small personal joys and sorrows, triumphs and failures leaven the letters. All husbands will appreciate his note of October 7, 1942, to his wife, in which he calls her attention to the reduction in their income which the new income-tax law would mean and asks her to take steps to reduce the food bill. He suggests cutting down portions served, and notes that one egg is enough for breakfast.

The letters are prepared by Elliott Roosevelt with the assistance of Joseph P. Lash; the job of selection and of editing, especially the addition of clarifying footnotes, was excellently done. The letters must be read by those who would understand the Roosevelt years; but, apart from their historical importance, they are absorbing in their own right.

Ralph McGill is editor of the Atlanta "Constitution."

Music and Musicians: A Selective List

by Cecil Smith

LAST SPRING the Second Symphony by Roger Sessions received the award of the Music Critics Circle for the best new American work played in New York during the season. If a similar citation were given for the year's best book about music, my vote would again go to Sessions—for *The Musical Experience of Composer, Performer, Listener* (Princeton University Press; $2.50).

A professor of musical composition at the University of California, and one of our distinguished academic musicians as well as a serious and important creative artist, Sessions has arrived at his knowledge and his articulateness by sweat and patience. He is equipped by temperament with a blunt honesty that makes him intolerant of fraud and subterfuge; he has spent his life (he's now 54) stubbornly trying to figure out what music is, how it ought to be written, and what purposes it can serve. Sessions would be the last to claim that he has found all the answers, but at least his analysis of what he calls "the musical experience" involves no nonsense or pretense. Some of his conclusions are revelatory, and most of them are thought-provoking.

In *The Musical Experience* Sessions begins by identifying the "sources of the musical impulse," not as the intellectual structures of musical theorists, but as such "human facts" as rhythmic feeling, breathing, gesture, movement and the producing of vocal sounds. He then assesses the function of the musical ear in co-ordinating and clarifying the works of musical art that are derived from the fundamental "human facts." Upon these bases he defines the relationship to music of the three people concerned with its existence—the composer, the performer and the listener. Since his book is addressed primarily to the last of these functionaries, he concludes it with an expression of concern for the independent and discriminating listener in the midst of today's "musical" mentality," which sees music as a commodity for large-scale mass distribution and its audience as consumers of a standardized product.

Somewhat more circumscribed in subject matter but no less the reflection of an expert and orderly mind is Arnold Schoenberg's *Style and Idea* (Philosophical Library; $4.75). Since the eminent 76-year-old composer has never been a prolific writer, this 224-page volume contains most of the significant commitments he has made about music outside his celebrated treatise on musical theory, the *Harmonielehre*. Schoenberg is especially instructive when he deals with the problems of composition; few books evoke a clearer sense of the mental processes and creative intuitions of the composer.

Two Centuries of Bach: An Account of Changing Taste, by Friedrich Blume; translated by Stanley Godman (Oxford University Press; $2), is also a work of considerable weight. With scholarship that sees large issues in the round without failing to account for the contributing details, and with a felicitous literary style that is preserved—perhaps enhanced—in the translation, Professor Blume (of the University of Kiel, Germany) recounts the changing fortunes of Bach's music from the last years of the composer's life to the present time. Holding that "we are still living on the inheritance of the Romantics," he hopes that we will "find the way made clear for a new conception" of Bach.

Much of the world's best thinking about music is contained in *Source Readings in Music History*, selected and annotated by Oliver Strunk of Princeton University (Norton; $8.50). The 903 pages of riches contained in this book stretch from Plato's consideration of the function of music in the ideal state (in *The Republic*) and Aristotle's definition of the place of music in liberal education (in *Politics*) down to nineteenth-century critical writings by Berlioz, Schumann, Liszt and Wagner. Wisely enough, in view of the difficulty of attaining historical perspective toward contemporary discussions, no twentieth-century authors are included. The span of subjects and viewpoints included in this distinguished collection is staggeringly wide; the ordering of them is clear and helpful; and the translations do a minimum of violence. This is the one basic book in the English language for everyone who wants to see and understand music in the largest context of cultural history.

Expositions of the lives and works of composers continue to come off the presses in a fairly steady stream. Several books already exist about Ralph Vaughan Williams, the dean of English nationalist composers, and the appearance of one more would seem a work of supererogation if it were not for the qualities of perception and literary expression its author brings to it—*Ralph Vaughan Williams: A Study*, by Hubert Foss (Oxford University Press; $3.50).

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The book is a series of informal essays on the composer's "Englishry," his freedom from sham and his personal history as a musician. No less inviting an importation from England is Percy M. Young's *The Oratorios of Handel* (Roy Publishers; $4.50), a delightfully written, picturesque, yet musically solid presentation and evaluation of Handel's major religious works, of which the "Messiah" is by no means the only example worth knowing.

Two American publications also deserve special mention: an authoritative but perhaps over-detailed treatment of the great seventeenth-century innovator, Claudio Monteverdi — *Monteverdi,* by Leo Schrade (Norton; $6)—and an unusually urbane collection of articles on Grieg's music—*Grieg: A Symposium,* edited by Gerald Abraham (University of Oklahoma Press; $3).

Along more popular lines, the current booklists include *Behind the Gold Curtain,* by Mary Ellis Peltz (Farrar, Straus; $2.50), a short history of the Metropolitan Opera, with many handsome pictures and a fact-ridden text that is dry as dust; and *Symphony Hall, Boston,* by H. Earle Johnson (Little, Brown; $6), an affable and colorful, if rather gushy, historical tribute to the home of the Boston Symphony Orchestra on the golden anniversary of the opening of the building. *The Oxford Companion to Music,* by Percy A. Scholes (Oxford University Press; $14.50), has now gone into its eighth edition, with some changes and emendations. It provides a good deal of useful and often amusing information, but the irritation caused by its omissions largely counterbalances the satisfaction afforded by its entries. If you have only one musical reference book, either Oscar Thompson's *Cyclopedia of Music and Musicians* (Dodd, Mead; $16) or Baker's *Biographical Dictionary of Musicians* (G. Schirmer; $6) is likely to serve your purposes better.

Books in Brief

Design in Music, by Gerald Abraham (Oxford University Press; $1). A friendly attempt to carry the uninitiated listener across the threshold of musical form and design.

The Orchestra from Beethoven to Berlioz, by Adam Carse (Broude Brothers; $7.50). An engrossing account of the development of the orchestra and its instruments, of the art and technique of conducting, and the techniques and personalities of famous nineteenth-century conductors.

Theatre Arts Anthology, by Rosamond Gilder and Others (Theatre Arts Books; $5). Contains articles on music and dance by Argentinita, George Beiswanger, Will Marion Cook, Agnes DeMille, Lehman Engel, Robert Edmond Jones, Lincoln Kirstein, Irving Kolodin, André Levinson, Richard Rodgers, Cecil Smith.

For Record Collectors

Four new guides to recorded music are available. The best, on all counts, is Irving Kolodin's *The New Guide to Recorded Music* (Doubleday; $4), for its listings are remarkably complete and the author's judgments are usually sound and interestingly presented. Moses Smith's *Selective Record Guide* (Macmillan; $4.50) provides three lists of expanding size and complexity, from a $100 basic library to a large and catholic collection. The listings make no claim to completeness. David Hall's *Records: 1950 Edition* (Knopf; $5) limits its field to records issued since December 31, 1947, and gives valuable facts and figures upon the various types of recordings now on the market, along with hints on the playing and care of records. The factual materials are admirable, but Mr. Hall's critical opinions are often somewhat unsettling. Julian Morton Moses' *Collector's Guide to American Recordings: 1895-1925* (American Record Collectors' Exchange; $3.75) provides a nearly exhaustive catalogue of American releases up to 1925.

[Cecil Smith's *Musical Comedy in America* (Theatre Arts Press; $5) is a critical history (he calls it "opinionated rather than measured") of the musical show on Broadway from "The Black Crook" to "South Pacific." The book contains 64 pages of photographs; it has a word, and sometimes many words, on every singer, dancer, composer, writer and comedian that you ever heard of, or your father before you. – THE EDITORS]

BOOTLESS ERRAND

HOLLYWOOD: THE DREAM FACTORY, by Hortense Powdermaker (Little, Brown; $3.50).

"An Anthropologist Looks at the Movie-Makers" is the descriptive subtitle of this book and it is an exciting idea. By moving in among the tribes of the West Coast, by analyzing their caste system, searching for the roots of their taboos, untangling the complexities of their power relationships, discovering the ethical bases of their religion and the ancient terrors of their superstitions, we should gain invaluable understanding of our mass entertainers, and of ourselves who envy and deride them and buy their fabulous wares. Dr. Powdermaker is to be congratulated for having hit upon so fertile a notion.

Alas, the congratulations may extend no further; *Hollywood: The Dream Factory* does not fulfill its promise. It is a richly anecdotal and strongly opinionated book, but it is not impressively

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scientific. I do not mean that the anecdotes are false or the opinions wrong (in most cases they are probably true and right), but that the content is more mortatory than systematic. Despite frequent interjections of "the anthropologist knows," "the anthropologist is well aware," and variations of this rather pompous springboard, Dr. Powdermaker offers us, not a field report on the movie capital, but a bill of complaints against it. And this indictment, whatever claim it may have to justice, has none at all to novelty. Hollywood suffers from an extreme neurosis induced by the conflict between business advantage and artistic integrity; human relationships in Hollywood, from back-slapping to bed-sharing, are defined by power and motivated by the hope for advantage; Hollywood fosters mediocrity and compliance, stifles talent and independence; the union contracts are defective, the production code is hypocritical, the methods of script construction are self-destructive, the directing is superficial, the acting is puppetry, the cost sheets are frivolously improvident (honorable exceptions to each of the above are dutifully cited). All this is true, all deplorable and all common knowledge.

The author's summation—that Hollywood's disdain for truth, its hierarchic structure, its manipulative techniques, its emphasis on fate at the expense of talent or effort bespeak a growing totalitarianism—is an observation in tune with the times. It could be said as well of Wall Street, the public-school system, organized religion or organized baseball, or any other institution the speaker dislikes. Hollywood shares the malaise of its epoch and the epoch shows a frightening turn toward unreason and brute power, but one suspects the author's scientific balance when she cites an incident of gross bullying as evidence of fascism in the studios.

Dr. Powdermaker devotes a considerable proportion of her pages to thumbnail sketches of typical executives, producers, directors, writers, etc. An indication of the profundity of these biographies is to be found in the names of their heroes: Mr. Big Shot, Mr. Intelligent, Mr. Mediocre, Mr. Good Judgment, Mr. Hopeful, Mr. Pretentious and Mr. Coincidence are a few of the performers in her morality play. It is not necessary, I think, to labor the point that an investigation content to organize its observations under such ready tags has failed to break through the surface. We know well enough by now "what's wrong with Hollywood"; it would have been instructive if an investigator trained in comparative cultures had offered us a few whys.

ROBERT HATCH

A GREAT LADY AND A POET

A POET'S NOTEBOOK, by Edith Sitwell (*Little, Brown*; $4).

FOR ALL the delights it affords, this book will prove a disappointment to those to whom the title promised an intimate account of the poet's labors. Neither does it offer such various commentary as makes Hopkins' *Notebooks* illuminate both his larger and lesser concerns. More than half of these pages are devoted to Miss Sitwell's annotations on Shakespeare's plays. Since a large part of this section consists of quotations from other writers, one familiar with Shakespearean criticism will again feel cheated. There is ample illustration, were it needed, of Miss Sitwell's sensitive ear, and there are wonderful insights, but there is also a tendency to extravagant writing that defeats its own purpose.

The more rewarding part of the book is made up of notations on other poets, and on the sources and the craft of poetry generally. Here again there is too little commentary by Miss Sitwell, but a wealth of quotations from saints and scientists, painters, composers, philosophers, poets and critics. The effect of it all is that of looking over the poet's shoulder as she sits in her library, and remarking the marginalia she makes on the pages of her books. This is a delightful occupation, for her library is richly furnished, her taste exquisite, and she sympathizes with the passions of both metaphysician and scholar. Not the least pleasure the book gave this reviewer was that of recognition, for it abounds in passages from Emerson and Rimbaud, Poincaré and Traherne, Schopenhauer and Blake, among others, that are old favorites with her. Since Miss Sitwell describes herself as one who "for many years . . . read with the fury of a cannibal hunting heads, with the reverence of a pilgrim approaching Mecca upon his knees," there are also unfamiliar, exciting trophies.

Occasionally one is inclined to take issue with the annotator, notably in some of her idiosyncratic disquisitions on phonetics. There is a more fundamental difference with Miss Sitwell. It is clear that she recognizes the evil and the anguish with which men's lives are set about. How else could she have written as she did about Shakespeare's tragedies? But of the famous triad, "the horror and the boredom and the glory," the element of glory is so great for her that too often she writes as one ignorant of the cruelties that are the substance of most men's days and nights. These are scattered notes, and perhaps one should not expect from them the lineaments of a coherent *Weltan-*

READER'S DIGEST
July, 1950
. . . There are millions who own life insurance policies payable in dollars now worth only 60¢ . . . says John T. Flynn, who warns that federal deficit spending is creating more and more inflation.
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schauung. Yet Miss Sitwell has read so many remarkable books and responded to them so deeply that one is always fancying that her own picture of the world will be shown forth here more definitely, though not more immediately, than it is in her poetry.

As might be imagined, the finest passages have to do with her chosen art. She quotes Aquinas on the triple perfection of God and observes, truly, that "The perfection of the spiritual life, as given here, is of the same order as the perfection of a poem." She writes with penetrating appreciation of the gentle Herrick and the roaring Dunbar, and with the practitioner's understanding of the marriage of sensuousness and spirit, the kindling genius and the arduous work that go to make a poem. What emerges from these pages, above all, is the personality of the woman who sits in her library, pencil in hand. She is a great lady and a poet, and her *Notebook,* with all its imperfections, retains the grace, the nobility, that belong to both.

BABETTE DEUTSCH

Babette Deutsch's most recent book of poems is "Take Them, Stranger"; her most recent prose book is "The Reader's Shakespeare." She is responsible for most of the translations in the currently published "A Treasury of Russian Verse," edited by Avrahm Yarmolinsky.

SOME ENGLISHMEN

The Age of Scandal, by T. H. White (Putnam; $3).

"Now that it is no longer possible to be a gentleman," one who has "lived to see the end of civilization in England" has compiled "this little scrapbook of a nostalgic Tory" to celebrate what he considers the peak of English culture: the latter part of the reign of George III. The result is slightly unpleasant: one form of petulant irresponsibility sustains another. Deploring a Labour Government which has depopulated the domestic staffs in England's larger houses and sponsored the incursions of "the wonderful proletariat" into the preserves of the aristocracy, Mr. White has run "away from the Bondfields and the Shinwells and the Bevans" to the "grand old days of Horace Walpole." Here he has assembled the curious and entertaining but so familiar gossip about the familiar ecccentrics from the familiar memoirs and letters. But Mr. White's elegiacs do his subject a grave disservice when he implies that the sometimes exquisite, sometimes brutal imbecilities he admires are the ultimate achievement of a leisured class. The remarkable thing is that as literary history this sort of "boudoir scholarship" still passes for currency even though it is now many years since Lytton Strachey debased the coin.

Helena, by Evelyn Waugh (Little, Brown; $2.75).

Helena is a Christian saint; she was the mother of Constantine; and "it is almost certain" that she directed the excavations at Jerusalem of the legendary True Cross of Christ. Beyond that, nothing is known of her; as a subject for a novel she permitted Mr. Waugh's imagination complete freedom. Too complete, perhaps, for while given few props and signposts to support and direct his story, he claims that nothing in it is "contrary to authentic history." To make a claim of authenticity in the absence of history is a feat beyond even Mr. Waugh's powers, and the consequence is embarrassed thinness.

The author *has* made Helena originally a Briton and cast her as a bluff, sensible matron: "It is all I ever asked, all my life, a straight answer to a straight question." She is properly cautious and conventional; her conversion to Christianity, it is suggested, was to a forthright conservative force which might contribute stability in troubled times. "I don't like new things," she says; "no one does in the land I come from," which presumably includes Mr. Waugh.

Charles Dickens, by Jack Lindsay (Philosophical Library; $4.75).

This is a bulky, heavily-documented book on a large subject, but there's a meagerness about it all the same. Mr. Lindsay's economies and simplifications have eliminated much we would expect in a biography as ambitious as this one. He tells the story of Dickens' life pretty much in terms of the novels, and then reads back into the life a couple of crude psychological formulas to explain the work of the artist. As a method of interpretation, this trick of mutually reflecting mirrors is hazardous, even in the case of Dickens, who (says Mr. Lindsay) "is always driven to scatter clues to the thing he is trying to hide."

More annoying is Mr. Lindsay's approach to the novelist as an inadequate sociologist. He had no "logically constructed political philosophy," which accounts for "the limitations of Dickens' thinking from first to last." For Mr. Lindsay, it is the artist's limitation that he thought in moral rather than in political terms! Actually, not his thinking but his modes of feeling frequently betrayed him, but even this weakness is least present in his social criticism.

J. F.

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Why THE NEW REPUBLIC

Is Important to Me

The Second-Prize Winning Letter in The New Republic Contest

by ORVIS C. IRWIN

I should like to set down the reasons "why the *New Republic* is important to me," or rather more precisely why the *New Republic* has suddenly again become important to me. The expression "suddenly again" is the term I should like to emphasize. Accordingly a little personal background is required for its clarification.

When the *New Republic* made its appearance in 1914 I was an undergraduate in college. As a high school youngster I had been politically nourished in the old Bob La Follette tradition. The new journal thus was a bright and welcome light, its bearers, Croly, Weyl, Straight and a group of eager fresh minds, had something stimulating to say to a young man facing the world. It was a timely and a highly fortunate experience. Until the Second World War I subscribed to it and whenever the money for the subscription renewal was not there I still managed to find the needed fifteen cents to buy an occasional copy at the bookstore. For years it continued to be a high minded liberal education in contemporary events and movements. I read it religiously.

But finally it came out flatly for a declaration of war against the Axis Powers. That this journal could advocate war was just too much. I felt a deep sense of disillusionment in the *New Republic*. I couldn't understand its position and I lost faith in it. So I cancelled my subscription. Believe me, it was like breaking with a dear and valued friend.

We now again are living in a fearfully confounded and dangerous world. The prospects are terrifying. The news is cluttered with conflicting and unreliable accounts. The big lie, à la Plato, is a commonplace, unprincipled chauvinism and stupid tub-thumping bedevil us. An unbelievable vacuum in national leadership characterizes both the Administration and the Congress. There is a hopeless absence of positive and constructive thinking among both Democrats and Republicans. I am distraught by the bankruptcy of wise and unhysteric solutions to the problems of achieving a stable peace as I have never in my lifetime been distraught.

Last week I bought a copy of the *New Republic* at the newstand. Today I bought another. What I read pleased me right down to the ground. Here was the old light again. There is the same exciting stimulus to sane thinking together with a cool and broadly based judgment operating upon the crowded and confused events of today. I find in it the kind of clarifying and orienting help I seem to need. Altogether it has been a thoroughly gratifying re-discovery.

It is for these reasons that the *New Republic* has become important, suddenly important, to me.

ORVIS C. IRWIN
Iowa City, Ia.

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